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COVERING AND IDENTITY PERFORMANCE IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
MEGAN VON BORSTEL* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
At a time when the law is transforming gay rights, the LGBTQ 
community finds itself at the climax of its latest civil rights challenge: 
federal employment non-discrimination protections. This Note addresses 
the federal circuit split regarding whether Title VII’s prohibition against 
sex discrimination includes a prohibition on the basis of sexual 
orientation. By integrating the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Community College within the frameworks of intersectionality, 
identity performance, and queer theory, this Note evaluates how an 
evolving understanding of Title VII’s protections affect members of the 
LGBTQ communities. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2017, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals marked a turning 
point in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College,1 holding that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation was prohibited under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In the same breath, the Eleventh Circuit 
found opposite in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital. 3 Since then, in 
Zarda v. Altitude Express,4 the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, joined the 
Seventh Circuit—cementing a clear circuit split on the issue. Meanwhile, 
the Trump Administration and the U.S. Justice Department have walked 
back President Obama’s executive support of employment discrimination 
protections.5  
 
 
*    Editor in Chief, Washington University Jurisprudence Review. J.D. Candidate, Washington 
University School of Law Class of 2019; B.A. and M.A., Political Science, Saint Louis University. 
1.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(finding that “a person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination on basis of her 
sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes”). See also Sari M. 
Alamuddin, Seventh Circuit Extends Title VII Protections to Sexual Orientation, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 
7, 2007), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/seventh-circuit-extends-title-vii-protections-to-sexual-
orientation. 
2.     Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).  
3.   See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation was not actionable under Title VII). 
 4.    Zarda v. Attitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
5.   See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Trump Administration, Intervening in Major LGBT Case, Says Job 
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Thus, at this critical juncture, it is essential to evaluate how civil rights 
advocates should adapt to this evolving legal and political landscape; how 
employment discrimination law should address concerns about 
discrimination based on sexual orientation; and how best to do so while 
integrating an identity performance and intersectional framework. This 
note addresses these questions by evaluating them through the lens of 
identity performance theory, the “covering” legal scholarship,6 and 
intersectionality theory in the workplace. This Note first discusses the 
implications of an evolving judicial and political landscape on 
employment protection efforts. The following section evaluates the 
renewed relevance of identity performance and intersectional theory as it 
relates to these efforts in the workplace. Finally, this Note argues that 
movement towards categorical employment protections for sexual 
orientation, although essential, ultimately displaces such discrimination 
elsewhere in more subtle, pervasive ways and fails to account for 
intersectional realities in the American workforce. Because of their 
intersectional identities, LGBTQ employees of color are in an especially 
vulnerable position under the current Title VII employment discrimination 
framework. Updating our understanding of identity performance in the 
workplace will require addressing these vulnerabilities in intersectional 
communities and adopting meaningful solutions under law.   
I.  CURRENT POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPES 
Understanding the political landscape is an essential prerequisite to 
effective advocacy for new civil rights legislation.7 How the American 
 
 
Bias Law Does Not Cover Sexual Orientation, WASH. POST (July 27, 2017), http://www.washingtonpo
st.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/27/trump-administration-intervening-in-major-lgbt-case-says-
job-bias-law-does-not-cover-sexual-orientation/?utm_term=.23654f66e095. 
6.  In renowned legal theorist Kenji Yoshino’s touchstone book, Covering, Yoshino identified 
three ways any minority group can assimilate: conversion, passing, and covering. He explains:  
Conversion means the underlying identity is altered. Conversion occurs when a lesbian 
changes her orientation to become straight. Passing means the underlying identity is not 
altered, but hidden. Passing occurs when a lesbian presents herself to the world as straight. 
Covering means the underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed. 
Covering occurs when a lesbian both is, and says she is, a lesbian, but otherwise makes it 
easy for others to disattend her orientation. 
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002). For Yoshino’s fully established theory of 
covering’s role in employment discrimination, see KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT 
ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).  
7.    William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of Coming Out: Religion, Homosexuality, and 
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2426, 2443 (1997) 
(recognizing that the current political temperature around a civil rights issue shapes potential outcomes 
and strategies, including the discourse around “coming-out” and being out in the workplace, which are 
“explicitly political act[s]”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/9
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populace is discussing an issue can shape how the executive branch or the 
legislature chooses to support or contest a change in the law.8 Likewise, in 
the judicial arena, often judges may more be inclined to “acquiesce [] in 
the political consensus.”9 There are three institutional players in the 
political landscape surrounding sexual orientation nondiscrimination 
protections: executive orders, national legislation, and agency guidelines 
and rulings. This Note will address significant developments in each of 
these arenas in turn.  
A. Executive Orders 
In 1998, President Bill Clinton passed the first executive order that 
included a prohibition on discrimination against federal employees 
because of their sexual orientation.10 Executive Order 13,160 prohibits, 
inter alia, “discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, 
disability, religion, age, sexual orientation, and status as a parent” in 
federal employment.11 At the time, the Executive Order excluded members 
of the armed forces and military academies.12 During his presidency, even 
“conservative, Republican President George W. Bush, Jr., continue[d] to 
enforce former President Bill Clinton’s 1998 Executive Order.”13 
President Obama further expanded those existing protections by adding 
gender identity as a protected characteristic; President Obama also 
extended federal employment protections based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity to employees working for federal government 
contractors.14 
However, since President Donald Trump took office, his 
administration has reversed previous administrations’ support for banning 
sexual orientation discrimination. In March 2017, President Trump 
rescinded former President Obama’s executive order, revoking key 
provisions that “ban[ ] federal contractors from discriminating against 
employees on the basis of sexual orientation or identity.”15 
 
 
8.  Id. at 2426. 
9.  Id.  
10.  Exec. Order. No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998).  
11.  Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 23, 2000). 
12.  MARIA L. ONTIVEROS ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 528 (9th ed. 2016). 
13. Toni Lester, Queering the Office: Can Sexual Orientation Employment Discrimination 
Laws Transform Work Place Norms for LGBT Employees, 73 UMKC L. REV. 643, 643 (2005).  
14.  Id. See also Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (2014).  
15.  Mary Emily O’Hara, LGBT Advocates Say Trump’s New Executive Order Makes Them 
Vulnerable to Discrimination, NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 8:45 A.M.), https://www.nbcnews.com/feat
ure/nbc-out/lgbtq-advocates-say-trump-s-news-executive-order-makes-them-n740301. 
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B. National Legislation 
The next piece of the political landscape is national legislation. 
Currently there is no federal law that explicitly prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.16 The history of 
congressional attempts to pass such legislation has been rocky. The 
Equality Act, first introduced to the House of Representatives in 1974, 
sought to prohibit discrimination, inter alia, on the basis of sexual 
orientation in federally assisted programs, housing, and financing.17 The 
original Act failed to ever reach a vote in the House of Representatives.18  
Over thirty years later, in 2007, the House of Representatives passed a 
version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which 
would protect employees from discrimination on the basis of “actual or 
perceived sexual orientation,” but not on the basis of gender identity.19 The 
ENDA failed to reach a vote in the Senate.20 Later, in 2009, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate both held hearings on a new version of the 
ENDA, which included protections for both sexual orientation and gender 
identity.21 That version failed to make it out of either chamber’s 
committee.22 
Most recently, in March 2019, representatives in both the House and 
Senate reintroduced the Equality Act.23 The current version of the Equality 
Act would amend Title VII to “ban discrimination against LGBTQ people 
in employment, housing, public accommodations, jury service, education, 
federal programs and credit.”24 
 
 
         16.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 491. However, there are currently twenty-one states 
that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and an additional twelve states that prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation against public employees. Twenty states prohibit 
discrimination based on gender identity, with an additional five states that prohibit discrimination 
against public employees based on gender identity. Additionally, there are an increasing number of 
city and municipal ordinances providing such protections nationwide. See State Map of Laws and 
Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (last visited Apr. 4, 
2019). For a more thorough discussion, see generally Jerome Hunt, A State-by-State Examination of 
Nondiscrimination Laws and Policies, CTR. AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (2012), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf. 
         17.  H.R. 15692, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
         18.  Id. 
         19.  See H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007). 
20.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 526. 
         21.  See H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009). 
         22.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 527. 
         23.  H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 788, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Tim Fitzsimons, 
Democrats Reintroduce Equality Act to Ban LGBTQ Discrimination, NBC News (Mar. 13, 2019 3:48 
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/democrats-reintroduce-equality-act-ban-lgbtq-discrim 
ination-n982771. 
  24. Id.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/9
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C. Agency Authority  
While national legislation defines the scope of federal law, 
administrative agencies and guidelines are critical enforcement 
mechanisms for those laws and policies. Agency guidelines are uniquely 
centered at the nexus of both the political and judicial landscapes. The 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), tasked with 
enforcing federal employment protections, is a model example. For one, 
the EEOC, as an executive agency, is undeniably political. Granted, the 
EEOC has strived to be bipartisan; it currently seats both Democrat and 
Republican commissioners.25  However, the EEOC appointment and 
confirmation processes, along with its employment guidelines and 
administrative decisions are political tools wielded by the executive.26 
The Agency’s rulings are judicial in nature. Like the patchwork of 
executive orders, the EEOC’s understanding of sexual orientation under 
Title VII is also evolving. The EEOC’s understanding is key because it is 
the executive agency tasked with enforcing Title VII.27 Also, to file a 
claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first file a charge 
with the EEOC.28 The federal judiciary also looks to the EEOC’S 
guidelines as an indicator of how the federal government may have 
intended Title VII to be interpreted.29 However, the EEOC’s rulings are 
not binding on federal courts—only federal employers.30 
  
 
 
25. The EEOC has five seats: currently one Republican, one Democrat, and three vacancies. 
See The Commission and the General Counsel, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/commission.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) 
blocked the renomination of Chai Feldblum in December 2018 because of her “radical views on 
marriage.” Tim Fitzsimons, GOP Senator Blocks Reappointment of EEOC’s Only LGBTQ 
Commissioner, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/gop-senator-
holding-reappointment-eeoc-s-only-lgbtq-commissioner-n949611. President Trump nominated one 
Republican to fill one of those vacancies, but the nominee has since withdrawn. Erin Mulvaney, 
Trump EEOC Nominee Daniel Gade Says He Withdrew Amid ‘Political Mess’, Nat’l L. J. (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/12/20/trump-eeoc-nominee-daniel-gade-says-
he-withdrew-amid-political-mess/?slreturn=20190229152044.  
26.  Id. 
27.  Lester, supra note 13, at 653.  
28. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FILING A CHARGE OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2018), http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm.  
29.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 528–29. 
30.  Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Until 2015, the EEOC’s rulings and guidelines were consistent with 
federal courts on this issue; sexual orientation was not included under Title 
VII’s ban on sex discrimination.31 In 2015, an EEOC ruling overturned the 
Agency’s position in Baldwin v. Foxx, holding that Title VII’s prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of sex should be interpreted to include 
an understanding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was 
barred as well.32 Although the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin is not binding 
on federal (or state) courts, its analysis is still critical to the development 
of the federal judiciary on this issue under Title VII.  
In Baldwin, the plaintiff, David Baldwin worked as Supervisory 
Traffic Control Specialist at Miami International Airport.33 When he was 
not promoted, Baldwin filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging he was 
denied because of his sexual orientation as a gay man.34 Baldwin based his 
charge on the several negative comments he received about his orientation 
from his supervisor. On appeal the EEOC emphasized that Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination “means that employers may not ‘rel[y] 
upon sex-based considerations’ or take gender into account when making 
employment decisions.”35 The EEOC held this protection “applies equally 
in claims brought by lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals under Title 
VII.”36 The EEOC explained its rationale using the following example:  
Sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because it 
necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of 
the employee’s sex. For example, assume that an employer 
suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a photo of her female 
spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for 
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk. The lesbian 
employee in that example can allege that her employer took an 
adverse action against her that the employer would not have taken 
had she been male.37 
 
 
31.  See, e.g., ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 496 (noting that EEOC’s previous position 
been consistent with DeSantis—the precedential 1979 Ninth Circuit case rejecting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation as “sex discrimination” under Title VII); accord DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 607 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated in part by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters, Inc., 256 
F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001).  
32.  Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015). 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239, 241-42 (1989)). The EEOC 
also clarified that as used in Title VII, “sex” “encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences 
between men and women—and gender.” Id. (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/9
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Reception of Baldwin’s significance has been mixed. On the one hand, 
“[c]ourts might defer to the Agency’s interpretation.”38 On the other hand, 
“[a]s an EEOC ruling, “Baldwin . . . is not controlling on the federal 
courts.”39 In fact, in its most recent opportunity, the Supreme Court 
declined to give the EEOC deference.40 For those reasons, some legal 
theorists argue that Baldwin is not “a watershed moment for advocates of 
LGBTQ workplace equality.”41 In fact, Baldwin may prove to be an 
anomalous decision if other federal courts do not follow in a similar 
fashion as the EEOC. 
D. Federal Judiciary 
Whether Title VII’s protections against sex discrimination in the 
workplace include sexual orientation discrimination has been the cause of 
decades of debate among legal theorists.42 Yet, it wasn’t until quite 
recently in the past two years that the federal judiciary began to take such 
a question seriously under Title VII.43 
In March 2017, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals broke from 
federal precedent in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College. In Hively, the 
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Title VII protects employees 
from discrimination on the basis of his or her sexual orientation.44 Within 
a month of the Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc, the Eleventh Circuit 
 
 
38.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 501; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944).  
39.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 501. 
40.  See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (declining deference to the 
Agency’s guidelines concerning the Pregnancy Discrimination Act due to “timing, consistency, and 
thoroughness of consideration); see also ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12, at 501. 
41.    Ryan H. Nelson, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII After Baldwin v. Foxx, 
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 255, 277 (2015).  
42.   See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 197–258 (1994); Shawn Clancy, The Queer Truth: The Need 
to Update Title VII to Include Sexual Orientation, 37 J. LEGIS. 119 (2011).  
43.  See, e.g., Muhammad v. Caterpillar Inc., 767 F.3d 694 (7th. Cir. 2014), as amended on 
denial of reh’g, (Oct. 16, 2014) (denying petitioner’s hostile work environment based on sexual 
orientation claim, but amending its decision to delete language that sexual orientation discrimination 
was non-cognizable under Title VII); Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Schs., 221 F. Supp.3d 255 (D. Conn. 
2016) (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment and reasoning that “straightforward 
statutory interpretation and logic dictate that sexual orientation cannot be extricated from sex; the two 
are necessarily intertwined in a manner that, when viewed under the Title VII paradigm set forth by 
the Supreme Court, place sexual orientation discrimination within the penumbra of sex 
discrimination.”); Examples of Court Decisions Supporting Coverage of LGBT-Related Discrimination 
Under Title VII, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/w
ysk/lgbt_examples_decisions.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (collecting cases). 
44. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 339–41 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
Notably, it is unclear how the Seventh Circuit’s decision affects those who do not identify along a 
gender binary. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ruled opposite the Seventh Circuit on the same question.45 Since, then, in 
Zarda v. Altitude Express,46 the Second Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit, 
cementing a circuit split and almost ensuring future resolution by the 
Supreme Court next term.  
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively relied on three strings of 
analysis. First, the court echoed back to the “comparative method.”47 This 
is the same method the EEOC relied on in the pivotal Baldwin.48 In the 
Seventh Circuit, Chief Judge Wood, writing for the majority reasoned: 
Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman (or 
living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had 
stayed the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her 
and would not have fired her . . . . This describes paradigmatic sex 
discrimination.49 
The dissent in Hively argued that the correct application of the 
comparative method in this context would be comparing the “treatment of 
men who are attracted to members of the male sex with the treatment of 
women who are attracted to members of the female sex, and ask whether 
an employer treats the men differently from the women.”50 The majority 
rejected the dissent’s comparison for similar reasons that it rejected an 
analogous comparison in Loving v. Virginia51:  
In the context of interracial relationships, we could just as easily 
hold constant a variable such as ‘sexual or romantic attraction to 
persons of a different race’ and ask whether an employer treated 
persons of different races who shared that propensity the same. That 
is precisely the rule that Loving rejected, and so too must we, in the 
context of sexual associations.52 
Quite simply, the Court reasoned that Hively was discriminated 
against based on her sex because it would be impossible to disentangle her 
sex from her sexual orientation. Thus, any employment discrimination 
based on her sexual orientation, necessarily entailed sex discrimination. 
 
 
45.  See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). 
46. Zarda v. Attitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
47.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 342, 345. 
48. As to whether the majority was persuaded by the EEOC’s Guideline and decision in 
Baldwin v. Foxx, the court remarked: “[o]ur point here is not that we have a duty to defer to the 
EEOC's position. We assume for present purposes that no such duty exists.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 344. 
49. Id. at 345.  
50.  Id. at 349. 
51.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6–11 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statues restricting 
the right to marry because of racial classifications violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
52.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 349. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/9
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The Court also relied on a second line of reasoning: the gender 
stereotyping analysis from the landmark Title VII sex discrimination case, 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.53  As the Supreme Court held in Price 
Waterhouse, “the practice of gender stereotyping falls within Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination.”54 In order to fully understand the 
impact of the Hively ruling and the sex-stereotyping analysis on future 
identity performance cases, it is important to first unpack the implications 
of Price Waterhouse.  
The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, was a senior 
manager denied partnership at her accounting firm, Price Waterhouse.55 
Hopkins filed a claim under Title VII, claiming her employer had 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex.56 The employer feedback 
during the partnership consideration process included criticisms that 
Hopkins, a woman, was too “macho,” used too much “profanity,” and was 
too “aggressive.”57 Partners also commented that Hopkins should “walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”58 Ultimately, Hopkins 
was denied partnership despite a stellar employment record.59 The Court 
held that Hopkins’ employer impermissibly relied on sex stereotyping at 
work.60 In doing so, the Court reasoned: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the 
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group, for [i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes. 61 
In Hively, the majority looked to this language in Price Waterhouse as 
indicative of a broad interpretation of sex stereotyping under Title VII.62  
  
 
 
53.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that employer discriminated 
against petitioner on the basis of her sex by relying on sex stereotypes).  
54.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 342. 
55.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32. 
56.  Id. at 231–32. 
57.  Id. at 235. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. at 233–34. 
60.  Id. at 251. 
61.  Id. (emphasis added) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
62.  Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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Later, the Supreme Court also directly extended its rationale in Price 
Waterhouse to a same-sex context in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc.63 Before Oncale, same-sex sexual harassment was not 
actionable under Title VII.64  There are three judicial approaches that the 
courts applied to handle same-sex sexual harassment. The first is that 
same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable because Congress did not 
intend to prohibit same-sex harassment when passing the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.65 To the extent that sex discrimination was a concern of the 
drafters at all,66 same-sex discrimination was not an evil the drafters were 
concerned with addressing.67 The second judicial approach to same-sex 
sexual harassment is that the plaintiff’s claim could only be actionable if 
the plaintiff could show the harasser was gay. If the plaintiff could prove 
the harasser was gay, then the plaintiff could presumably establish the 
defendant harassed the plaintiff based on sexual desire. Absent such 
evidence, plaintiff’s claim was only discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and therefore not actionable under Title VII.68 The third 
judicial approach to same-sex sexual harassment claims is that any 
harassment that is sexual in nature is always actionable under Title VII, 
regardless of the harasser’s sexual orientation or motivations.69 These 
approaches—each adopted by some courts across the country—are 
inherently incompatible. Thus, in resolving this question, the Court faced a 
critical turning point. 
The Court’s decision in Oncale was essential to abolishing the first 
judicial approach to same-sex sexual harassment. In Oncale, the plaintiff 
 
 
63.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
64.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12 at 501.  
65.  Id. 
66.  When the House of Representatives was debating Title VII, conservatives added the 
category of “sex” as an attempted “poison pill” to defeat the amendment—not as a genuine attempt to 
address sex discrimination. Francis J. Mootz III, Judging Well, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 28, n.96 
(2019). The Supreme Court has recognized this historical pretext to Title VII:  
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute 
on the floor of the House of Representatives. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577–84 (1964). The principal 
argument in opposition to the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently 
different from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative 
treatment. See id. at 2577 (statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States 
Department of Labor); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Green). This argument was defeated, the 
bill quickly passes as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in 
interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on “sex.”  
Id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986)). 
67.  Id. 
68.  Bizarrely, if the harasser was bisexual, then some courts held plaintiff’s claim was not 
actionable because the defendant was thereby an “equal opportunity harasser” and their behavior was 
outside the scope of discrimination based on sex. Id. 
69.  Id. 
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was sexually harassed and physically threatened by his other male 
coworkers and supervisors on the all-male oil rig in which he worked.70 
Ultimately, the plaintiff quit his job because of the sexual harassment and 
brought a claim against his employer under Title VII.71 The Court 
reasoned that the critical issue underpinning the case was whether 
members of one sex were exposed to disadvantaged terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex were not exposed.72 The 
Court also recognized that while same-sex sexual harassment was surely 
not the principal evil Congress intended to address by enacting Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, statutes often go beyond the principal evil of 
their enactment, evolving to cover other comparable evils as well.73 This 
further clarified the Court’s precedent established in Price Waterhouse.  
However, while the Court’s decision in Oncale resolved the question 
of whether a same-sex sexual harassment claim is actionable under Title 
VII, the precise evidentiary path a plaintiff must pursue to bring a 
successful claim remains unclear today.74 In that regard, the courts have 
not unanimously nor consistently adopted a single judicial approach.75 
Scholars have identified three possible evidentiary routes to prove same-
sex sexual harassment: (1) prove the harasser is gay; (2) prove that the 
female employee or supervisor who harassed the female victim did so in a 
way that indicates the harasser is generally hostile to women in the 
workplace; or (3) offer comparative evidence of how the harasser treats 
both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace environment.76  
These evidentiary routes are problematic for several reasons. For one, 
the judicial uncertainty is emblematic of inconsistencies with how the 
federal judiciary treats same-sex related discrimination claims—not only 
regarding same-sex sexual harassment, but also with sexual orientation 
claims under Title VII. Additionally, the different evidentiary routes raise 
a steep hill for any potential plaintiff to climb to successfully bring a 
same-sex sexual harassment claim. For instance, in Oncale, while the 
Court reversed the summary judgment against plaintiff, the Court did not 
directly find for plaintiff either. On remand, the plaintiff’s only viable 
 
 
70.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. 
71.  Id.  
72.  Id. at 80–82. 
73.  Id. at 79–80.  
74.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12 at 501. 
75.  Id. The first approach is no longer viable, post-Oncale, which held that same-sex 
harassment is actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. The second 
approach remains partly viable depending on the circuit. The third approach is the rationale the 
Seventh Circuit adopted in Hively. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
76.  ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12 at 505. 
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evidentiary route of those identified above would be to prove that his 
harasser was gay. In an all-male workplace environment, the other two 
evidentiary routes would not be available. This raises a critical issue with 
the scope of the Court’s analysis. It is one thing to say that a claim is 
theoretically actionable; it is another thing entirely to make that claim 
realistically possible to pursue. This is a critical lesson to remember as the 
Court prepares to determine whether sexual orientation is directly 
actionable under Title VII.  
With this in mind, the Court’s rationale in Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale laid the foundation for the Hively majority: sexual harassment 
based on gender stereotyping includes whether “the sex of the harasser is 
(or is not) the same as the sex of the victim.”77 Accordingly, the Hively 
majority held that “Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to 
conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as 
modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other 
forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual."78  
 Finally, the third line of reasoning the majority relied on in Hively, 
was the Supreme Court’s long line of cases based on “associational 
theory.”79 Beginning with Loving80 and Obergefell,81 the court drew an 
analogy to the Supreme Court’s well-settled law that discrimination based 
on whom a person associates with is a form of prohibited discrimination 
against the person “because of his or her [own traits.]”82 The court also 
noted that while Loving was a racial discrimination case, “the text of the 
statute draws no distinction, for this purpose, among the different varieties 
of discrimination it addresses,” and is therefore applicable outside a racial 
context.83 Likewise, although Obergefell was a case about the right to 
marry, not Title VII, the majority reasoned that “[t]oday’s decision must 
be understood against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not 
only in the field of employment discrimination, but also in the area of 
broader discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”84  
  
 
 
77.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75). 
78.  Id. at 346. 
79.  Id. at 342. 
80.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
81. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
82.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 347-50. 
83.  Id. at 349. 
84.  Id. 
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Thus, in Hively, the majority reasoned that associational theory 
likewise prohibits discrimination against individuals for his or her intimate 
associations based on his or her sexual orientation.85 Ultimately, the 
majority relied on all three lines of reasoning: the comparative method, 
sex stereotyping, and the associational theory. Each of these the theories 
impact identity performance claims and intersectional theory in distinct 
ways. 
In order to evaluate how the Hively lines of reasoning impact identity 
performance and intersectional theory, it is first noteworthy to understand 
why the dissent in Hively—along with the majority of federal circuit 
courts—remain squarely opposite the Seventh Circuit. The dissent 
reasoned that the “question before the [court] was one of statutory 
interpretation.”86 Therefore, the court should not, in good conscience, 
“smuggle in” “aggressive” textual interpretations that would be 
“[un]faithful” to Title VII’s text.87 In this spirit of strict statutory 
construction, the dissent relied on “the traditional first principle of 
statutory interpretation”: “interpreting the statutory language as a 
reasonable person would have understood it at the time of enactment.”88 
To do otherwise—as the dissent alleges the majority does—would be to 
“assume the power to alter the original public meaning of a statute.” A 
power left to the legislature—not the judiciary.89 While the dissent 
acknowledged a “robust debate . . . in our culture, media, and politics” 
about sexual orientation discrimination and gay rights, the dissent declined 
to incorporate any culture change into its analysis.90  Rather, the “sole 
inquiry” for the dissent was whether dominant interpretation—that Title 
VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination—was “wrong as an 
original matter.”91 On that question, the dissent concluded the answer 
“begin[s]” and “largely ends” with the statutory text.92 Therefore, the 
dissent would have held that textually, the word “sex” means “biologically 
male or female; it does not also refer to sexual orientation.”93 
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital94 
provides a recent illustration of the Hively dissent’s arguments as applied 
 
 
85.  Id. 
86.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
87.  Id.  
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 361. 
91.  Id.  
92.  Id. at 362. 
93.  Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting). 
94.  Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
376     WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:2 
 
 
 
to sexual orientation and gender non-conformity discrimination Title VII 
claims. Jameka Evans alleged her employer discriminated against her 
because of her sexual orientation and gender non-conformity.95 Evans, a 
security officer at a hospital, alleged she was denied equal pay, harassed, 
and physically assaulted because she did not “carry herself in a traditional 
woman[ly] manner . . . (male uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.).”96 
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petitioner’s claim alleging employment 
discrimination based on her sexual orientation; found “[its] binding 
precedent forecloses” such an action; and held that while a gender-
nonconformity claim is actionable, the petitioner had failed to adequately 
plead such a claim.97  
Compared to the majority in Hively, the majority in Evans held that 
the Supreme Court’s precedents in Price Waterhouse and Oncale did not 
establish the basis for a sex-discrimination claim based on sexual 
orientation under Title VII.98 The court acknowledged that discrimination 
based on failure to conform to a gender stereotype is sex-based 
discrimination.99 However, the court declined to extend that rationale to a 
sexual orientation context. While the Eleventh Circuit recognized that 
discrimination claims based on gender non-conformity and same-sex 
discrimination are actionable under Title VII, it did not find the analysis of 
either Price Waterhouse or Oncale sufficiently “on point.”100 The court 
also relied heavily on previous holdings in other circuits reaching the same 
conclusion.101 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that until the 
Supreme Court “squarely addresses” sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by its precedent.102 
In its next term, the Supreme Court will consider whether to resolve 
the circuit split and take up the challenge to Title VII. 103 In “an unusual 
 
 
95.  Id. at 1250. 
96.   Id. at 1251 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court also notes that “although 
[Evans] is a gay woman, she did not broadcast her sexuality.” Id. This is a distinguishing fact for the 
Eleventh Circuit because it reasons that Evans’ discrimination was a response to gender stereotyping, 
not her sexual orientation. Id. 
97.    Id. at 1255 (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)) (reasoning 
the court was bound to follow circuit precedent “unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc 
or by the Supreme Court”) (citation omitted).  
98.    Id. at 1256. 
99.    Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 
100.   Id. at 1256. 
101.   Id. at 1257 (collecting cases from nine of the other federal circuit courts of appeal, dating 
back from 1989 to 2005). 
102.   Id. 
103.  Jon Steingart, LGBT Workers’ Federal Civil Rights Back on Supreme Court Radar, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (NOV. 8, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/lgbt-workers-
federal-civil-rights-back-on-supreme-court-radar. 
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twist,” the Trump Administration has poised itself on “opposite sides from 
the [EEOC]”—going so far as to write amicus briefs contrary to the 
EEOC’s position in Baldwin v. Foxx, which interpreted sexual orientation 
as within Title VII’s protections.104 Thus, in light of this inverted legal and 
political landscape, legal theorists should revisit the fundamentals of 
identity performance theory and intersectional theory in employment 
discrimination law jurisprudence. By viewing the reasoning in Hively 
through these lenses, we can better determine to what extent an 
incorporation of sexual orientation into Title VII will align with these 
theoretical objectives and in what ways the law must adapt. 
 
I. INTERSECTIONALITY, IDENTITY PERFORMANCE AND COVERING 
THEORY 
 
A. Intersectionality Theory 
 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, a leading intersectionality scholar, 
explains intersectionality scholarship as a critique of the “tendencies to see 
race and gender as exclusive or separable categories” that in reality 
intersect to form “multidimensional” identities.105 Intersectionality theory 
has also been applied to queer theory,106 but remains of particular 
relevance to the intersection of race, sex, class, and sexuality. 
Intersectionality scholarship shapes the employment discrimination 
discussion in several ways. For one, it has shifted the discussion from 
“monolithic groups” to interactions between patriarchy, racial oppression, 
and homophobia.107 In addition, intersectional critiques have highlighted 
that such discussions tend to revolve around individuals of relative 
privilege.108 Critiques have also emphasized the importance of evaluating 
 
 
104.    Ariane de Vogue, LGBT Employment Cases on Road to Supreme Court, CNN NEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2017 6:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/lgbt-employment-case-index.html. 
105.    KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, BEYOND RACISM AND MISOGYNY: BLACK FEMINISM 
AND 2 LIVE CREW, IN WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 111, 114 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My 
Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991); 
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 615 (1990); 
Darren Leonard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the 
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 284, 301–03 (2001) 
[hereinafter Hutchinson, Identity Crisis]. 
106.   See, e.g., Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104; Robert S. Chang & Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., After Intersectionality, 71 UMKC L. REV. 485 (2002).  
107.    Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 308. 
108.    See CRENSHAW, supra note 105, at 151. This can include a focus in the literature on the 
most privileged members within protected groups (e.g. the impact of sexism on white cisgender 
women; racism on black men; heterosexism on wealthy, cisgender, white men, etc., often excluding 
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all different systems of oppression and their interplay in order to design 
solutions to any single system of oppression.109 
Within a queer theory context, it is important to evaluate the 
intersection between heterosexism, racism, and sexism in the workplace. 
A corollary theory, “multidimensionality” posits that these different forms 
of identity and oppression “are inextricably and forever intertwined.”110 
Multidimensionality also recognizes the inherent complexities of not only 
individual identities, but also systems of oppression and social power.111  
Multidimensionality is especially relevant to intersection Title VII 
disparate treatment claims. Under the current framework, federal courts 
tend to evaluate a plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim by isolating 
the employer’s motivation behind the alleged adverse employment 
action.112 Under Title VII, the employer’s motivation cannot be “because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”113 
However, multidimensional and intersectional scholarship understands 
discrimination as when multiple identities and stereotypes “converge” into 
a specific discriminatory act.114 This requires a “holistic examination” of 
the causes and effects of those prejudices—not a single characteristic or 
motivation.115  
 
B. Identity Performance Under Title VII 
 
An individual’s identity performance is the collection of one’s 
intersectional identities, including race, sex, gender identity, ethnicity, and 
sexual orientation. Identity performance is also the many ways that in our 
everyday interactions our bodies, mannerisms, clothing, movement, and 
speech convey information about ourselves to others.116 Identity 
performance is both introspective and a matter of public perception; it is a 
 
 
discussion of less privileged members of those groups, namely women of color, transgender people, 
and people of lower socioeconomic status). 
109.    Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 308; see also Francisco Valdes, Sex and 
Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 25 (1995). 
110.    Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal 
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 621–22, 641 (1997) (arguing that any 
discussion of gay politics should also discuss racial, class, and gender privilege).  
111.    Id. See also Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 9 BERKLEY WOMEN’S L. J. 103 (1994); Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis 
and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673 (2000). 
112.    Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 301–03. 
113.    Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)). 
114.    Arriola, supra note 111, at 139–41. 
115.    Id. 
116.    See generally FRED DAVIS, FASHION, CULTURE AND IDENTITY (1992).  
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combination of how one seeks to convey their identity and self to the 
outside world and how others perceive those cues.117 Thus, one’s identity 
performance is rarely static—but rather an evolving and responsive 
dynamic. By learning to interpret other people’s responses to one’s 
identity performance, an individual can better adapt their performance in 
accordance with what he or she intended. This is known as impression 
management.118 
Identity performance can play a critical role in the employment arena. 
It can shape both an employee and employer’s schema119 in the 
workplace.120 These schemas “enable” employees and employers to “know 
(or believe [they] know) a great deal about [a] person . . . in a shorthand 
fashion.”121 This shapes how coworkers, supervisors, and employers 
perceive, treat, and value an employee.122  
In the context of Title VII, often an employee’s identity performance 
cannot be captured under a single category of prohibited discrimination.123 
This is because “most courts effectively require that distinct minority 
subclasses frame employment discrimination claims as a member of one 
protected class or another, but not as a member of two or more protected 
groups.”124 Thus, the current Title VII employment discrimination 
framework does not account for plaintiffs’ intersectionality or more 
complex identity performances.125 Consequently, “individuals who are 
members of multiple protected classes often lack a complete remedy in the 
employment discrimination context.”126  
This poses distinct problems for members of the LGBTQ community. 
As discussed above, no federal statute currently expressly prohibits 
discrimination based on either sexual orientation or gender identity. Some 
scholars have coined employer discrimination based on sexual 
 
 
117.    ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES (1963). 
118.    Id. 
119.    Schemas are “a set of beliefs about people, events or situations that we use as guides in 
our interaction with these things.” Todd Brower, Social Cognition ‘At Work:’ Schema Theory and 
Lesbian and Gay Identity Under Title VII 2 (2008). 
120.    Id. 
121.     Id. at 2. 
122.    Id. 
123.    Alexander M. Nourafshan, The New Employment Discrimination: Intra-LGBT 
Intersectional Invisibility and the Marginalization of Minority Subclasses in Antidiscrimination Law, 
24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 108–11 (2017); see also Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 
104, at 301–03 (“[C]ourts have failed to recognize that the cumulative effect of multiple forms of 
discrimination may create a unique type of victimization that differs in kind from the sum of individual 
acts of discrimination.”). 
124.    Nourafshan, supra note 123 at 108. 
125.    Id. 
126.    Id. 
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discrimination, rather than on a protected characteristic under Title VII 
(e.g. race, sex, national origin) as the “Sexual Orientation Loophole” of 
Title VII.127 In the context of combined race and sexuality discrimination 
claims, (e.g., LGBTQ people of color), this can be especially problematic: 
“the unprotected status of sexual orientation in civil rights jurisprudence, 
along with judicial essentialism, actually provides an incentive for 
defendants to concede homophobic intent as a way of masking and 
obscuring racism.”128 In these cases,129 courts have used evidence of 
sexual orientation discrimination to negate the possibility of racial 
discrimination, ignoring the reality that plaintiffs with intersectional 
claims face “unique discrimination as gays and lesbians of color.”130  
Therefore, “intersectional LGBT plaintiffs can actually lose the ability 
to bring a successful claim based on other protected characteristics.”131 
This hole in employment discrimination coverage is increasingly 
problematic for potential plaintiffs because intersectional claims of 
employment discrimination are on the rise.132  
There are three reasons why the federal judiciary has failed to embrace 
intersectional discrimination claims. The first reason is directly related to 
Title VII’s textual language.133 Title VII relies on the “disjunctive ‘or’ in 
describing discrete minorities that are protected under the statute.”134 
Specifically, the pertinent provision of Title VII’s text protects against 
discrimination “based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”135 
This has resulted in courts interpreting the text of the statute to mean, e.g., 
a plaintiff cannot be discriminated against based on their race or their sex 
(i.e. including his or her sexual orientation). However, this interpretation 
does not expressly prohibit discrimination based on a combination of 
factors, (e.g. race and sex).136  
 
 
127.    Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 302–03; see also Zachary A. Kramer, 
Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. L. REV. 205, 242–43 (2009) (“[E]mployers are already using 
this defense—indeed, with great success.”) 
128.    Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 306. 
129.    See, e.g., Peterson v. Bodlovich, 215 F.3d 1330 (Table) (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
prison officials did not racially discriminate against black gay male prison inmate, despite evidence of 
racist and homophobic treatment); see also Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 303–06 
(analyzing Peterson and collecting cases). 
130.    Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 104, at 303. 
131.    Id.; see also Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of 
Intersectionality in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 1008 (2011) (“Intersectional claims 
have increased dramatically over time.”). 
132.    Nourafshan, supra note 123, at 99.  
133.    Id. at 117. 
134.    Id. 
135.    42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
136.    See Hutchinson, supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]                     COVERING AND IDENTITY PERFORMANCE              
 
 
 
393 
Inherently, this seems counterintuitive to the rationale underpinning 
anti-discrimination laws. If Title VII seeks to prevent and remedy 
discrimination based on a protected characteristic, why would it not 
likewise seek to prevent discrimination based on multiple protected 
characteristics? The answer is rooted in the second reason behind the 
failure of mainstream intersectional claims: the federal judiciary’s reliance 
on the single-motive framework.137 The entire foundation for a Title VII 
disparate treatment claim was based in the single-motive or “McDonnell 
Douglas framework”—the cornerstone of Title VII disparate treatment 
discrimination lawsuits.138  
Established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Court outlined the 
framework for bringing and defending a disparate treatment claim under 
Title VII.139 First, a plaintiff must establish a prima-facie case: (1) the 
plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified 
for the position or performing at the employer’s expectations; (3) the 
plaintiff was not hired or the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 
action by the defendant; and (4) the position remained open or a “similarly 
situated” employee did not receive comparable adverse employment 
action.140 At the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the 
defendant has a rebuttal burden to show a “legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason” for the employment action.141 Finally, at the third stage, the 
plaintiff has the final burden to establish that any reason the defendant 
offered was actually a pretext for discrimination.142  
This framework is known as the single-motive framework because in 
order to prevail, the plaintiff must meet the final burden of persuasion that 
their protected characteristic was the single cause for the discrimination—
not the reason(s) offered by the defendant.143 A false reliance on the 
single-motive framework discourages a plaintiff from brining an 
intersectional claim by its very nature because often there is no “single-
motive” for the adverse employment action, but rather a motive driven by 
multiple biases against the plaintiff’s intersectional identities.144 
  
 
 
137 .    Nourafshan, supra note 123, at 117. 
138.    ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 12. 
139.    McDonnell Douglas, Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
140.    Id. 
141.    Id. 
142.    Id. 
143.    Id.; see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of 
Analysis Under Title VII 98 GEO. L. J. 1121 (2010). 
144.    Nourafshan, supra note 123, at 117. 
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The federal courts’ reliance on the single-motive framework poses 
problems for intersectional plaintiffs who bring disparate impact claims as 
well: 
In establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff 
first must identify a specific employment practice to be challenged, 
and then, through relevant statistical analysis, must prove that the 
challenged practice has an adverse impact on a protected group. In 
making these comparisons, a plaintiff must demonstrate disparate 
impact with respect to the pool of qualified persons in the relevant 
labor market for the given position. 145 
This is problematic for intersectional plaintiffs because it would be very 
difficult—if not impossible—to establish a statistical comparison to a 
“similarly situated plaintiff” who did not face discrimination in his or her 
workplace.146  
As the American population becomes increasingly racially and 
ethnically diverse, more openly LGBTQ, and more fluid in its 
understanding of gender identity and expression, it will become 
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to reduce their discrimination claims to 
one element of their identity.147 This is especially true when we consider 
how discrimination manifests in a workplace. The reality is workplace 
discrimination does not operate upon discrete elements of a person’s 
identity; rather, it is more often a person’s reaction to an individual’s 
whole identity performance. 
 
C. Covering Theory and Employment Discrimination 
 
Covering is the “act of downplaying a disfavored identity—even when 
this identity is known or apparent to others—in order to present oneself 
more palatably as part of the so-called American mainstream.”148 Covering 
is the consequence of implicit expectations and self-censorship of identity 
performance in the workplace. Fifteen years after Kenji Yoshino’s 
milestone analysis of covering in the workplace, covering remains a 
 
 
145.   Id. 
146.   Nourafshan offers an illustrative example of this dynamic in a race-sex claim context: 
[I]f a black woman is alleging race-sex intersectional discrimination, an employer might use 
statistics that show that he has eight black employees, and ten female employees. These 
statistics fail to reveal that seven of the black employees are men and nine of the female 
employees are white. There is only one black woman, and her claim can therefore be 
undermined. Use of statistics is thus problematic in this context. 
Id. at 119. 
147.   Id. 
148.   Yoshino, Covering, supra note 6, at 769. 
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routine dynamic in American workplaces for employees who are members 
of certain racial, ethnic, sex, gender, and sexual orientation groups. 
Therefore, it is critical to understand the theoretical underpinnings of 
covering in the workplace and identify how the expectation to cover can 
have a coercive pressure on employees—even as employers move away 
from expectations of conversion and passing. The tendency—or worse, 
implicit expectation—for an employee to cover can still create coercive 
pressure dynamics in a workplace.  
Yoshino outlines “four axes of behavior” individuals cover along: 
“appearance, affiliation, activism, and association.”149 “Appearance” 
entails the clothing, grooming, and mannerisms one chooses to present or 
unconsciously conveys to the their environment.150 Yoshino also explains 
that individuals can “cover” their appearance through the many ways they 
pay extra attention to how specifically they are communicating their 
identities to their peers.151 That also includes the nuances of gestures and 
information about one’s personal life as well.”152 “Affiliation” is a concept 
that encompasses the different ways in which a person voluntarily chooses 
to associate within a particular cultural context or group. “Activism” is the 
willingness of someone to take the initiative and incorporate social causes 
or issues related to one’s membership in a group. Finally, “association” is 
the direct confrontation of one’s identity with its associated traits or 
behaviors. Yoshino explains these four axes within an LGBTQ context:153 
(1) [A]ppearance, including gender performance or being a so-
called straight-acting gay;154 (2) affiliation, avoiding gay social 
settings like Fire Island in New York, and gay culture more 
generally;155 (3) activism, eschewing the stereotype of the ‘gay 
activist’;156 and (4) association, including avoiding public displays 
of affection.157 
Yoshino cautions there are a few important considerations when 
evaluating these four axes of covering. First, these covering behaviors are 
not limited to the workplace; nor are they necessarily a dynamic in every 
workplace.158 Second, “we should not assume that everybody who engages 
 
 
149.   Id. 
150.   Id. 
151.   Id. 
152.   Id. at 813. 
153.   Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007). 
154.   See YOSHINO, COVERING, supra note 6, at 79–82. 
155.   Id. at 82–85. 
156.   Id. at 87–88. 
157.   Id. at 89–91. 
158.   Robinson, supra note 153, at 1811. 
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in acts of assimilation is covering.”159 What one considers to be an 
authentic self-expression or presentation of identity can only be truly 
understood by the individual. Thus, while someone may perceive that a 
person appears to be covering, it is actually the person’s self-
understanding that controls whether they indeed are doing so.160 Finally, 
Yoshino emphasizes that everyone covers—no matter their race, gender, 
sex, etc. or how integrated they are into the mainstream.161 This principle 
recognizes that “every person covers in some way to be seen as ‘normal,’ 
and “place[s] more emphasis on a new understanding of civil rights that 
would allow all individuals to put forth their authentic selves.”162 
Understanding covering within the employment context is easier after 
considering other examples of covering in a variety of contexts. For 
example, some of Yoshino’s most illustrative examples include: 
Margaret Thatcher, who took voice lessons to lower the pitch of her 
voice, and Rosie O’Donnell, who, even after she came out of the 
closet, did not make public appearances with her female partner. 
Several actors cover their racial or religious identities in order to 
secure mainstream acceptance: Martin Sheen was born Ramón 
Estévez; Kirk Douglas’s given name is Issur Danielovitch 
Demsky.163 
The critical point here is that these people were denying their identities. 
Margaret Thatcher is a woman. Rosie O’Donnell is openly gay. Martin 
Sheen and Kirk Douglas have distinct ethnic backgrounds. However, these 
examples do illustrate the deliberate efforts each person took to “mute or 
deflect stigmatized identities.” 
How Yoshino recommends that the legal community adapt to the 
problem of covering is particularly salient given the current momentum 
surrounding Title VII. Yoshino advocates for a civil rights model based 
not on legislative intent behind Title VII, strict statutory construction, or 
analogies to sex stereotyping, the comparative method, or the associational 
theory—although Yoshino’s argument is closest to the final line of 
reasoning. Yoshini roots his model in a fundamental concept of universal 
liberty. This is a deliberate step away from the type of equality-based 
liberty that the Supreme Court has evoked throughout its string of LGBT 
 
 
159.   Id. 
160.   Id. 
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rights cases including Romer v. Evans,164 Lawrence v. Texas,165 United 
States v. Windsor,166 and Obergefell.167 
Yoshino advocates separately for individual liberty. By evoking a 
central thesis of individual liberty, Yoshino hopes to invite more people to 
the table for the civil rights model. Because everyone covers, not simply 
minorities, an individual liberty model is adaptable and relevant to all. 
This is a strong divergence from the more traditional queer and identity 
performance theory that emphasizes the importance of protecting 
historically disenfranchised groups and promoting equal opportunity to 
combat systemic inequities. By advocating for a more individualistic, and 
less class-centric model, Yoshino’s theory refocuses the discussion around 
the numerous individual identities that shape how all Americans live their 
lives; identities that are not historically recognized as barriers to 
employment or the workplace. 
However, given Yoshino’s argument that everyone covers, that leads to 
the natural conclusion that everyone also covers in different ways across 
different axes with respect to an individual’s identities. The striking 
increase in intersectional employment discrimination Title VII claims 
substantiates this reality. Yet, this also becomes particularly problematic 
given the current reality that plaintiffs remain unable to allege 
supplementary theories of discrimination under Title VII. Rather, plaintiffs 
remain forced to raise one—and only one—particular member class in 
which to root their claim. Therefore, while identity performance theory 
and non-discrimination laws have made great advances in the past fifteen 
years, there remains a critical disconnect between Yoshino’s individual 
liberty theory and the reality of plaintiffs’ Title VII prospects. 
CONCLUSION 
Queer legal theory and employment discrimination jurisprudence are at 
a critical crossroads. While federal legislation to expand employment 
protections for the LGBTQ community has stalled,168 and the Trump 
Administration threatens to rollback existing protections,169 there is 
increasing focus on how the Supreme Court will resolve the federal circuit 
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168.   See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
169.   See Michael D. Shear and Charlie Savage, In One Day, Trump Administration Lands 3 
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split. Thus, at this crossroads, it is essential to evaluate the existing 
employment discrimination framework and determine how the federal 
judiciary and legal community should best adapt to evolutions in our 
understandings of sex-stereotyping and gender under Title VII and in the 
American workplace.  
To do so, this Note reviewed the status of employment protections at 
each national level: executive orders, national legislation, agency 
guidelines, and the federal judiciary. At the federal judicial level, the 
circuit split between the Seventh Circuit in Hively and the Second Circuit 
in Zarda, versus all of the other circuits, presents a unique opportunity to 
evaluate the underlying arguments. The Hively majority outlines how the 
Supreme Court’s precedents in Price Waterhouse and Oncale provide the 
rationale to include sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s line of cases from Loving to Obergefell 
provide a separate basis to include sexual orientation under Title VII based 
on the associational theory. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s majority 
opinion delivers the Supreme Court a clear blueprint for how to determine 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is on the basis of sex, 
and therefore prohibited under Title VII’s employment protections. 
However, no matter how the Supreme Court resolves the Title VII 
question, it is essential to critically evaluate the surrounding scholarship 
on the issue as well. Applying intersectionality theory to LGBTQ 
employment discrimination claims highlights the importance of 
recognizing that plaintiffs’ claims are not simply an isolated question of 
their sexuality in the workplace; rather, their claims require a holistic 
examination of how each part of plaintiffs’ identities—including their 
race, sex, gender identity, and class—converge to shape their identity 
performance and treatment in the workplace.  
By revisiting Yoshino’s Covering scholarship, we can better 
understand how these intersectional identities manifest in the workplace 
and create implicit discrimination in various ways. Appreciating the 
importance of identity performance will also be critical to empower 
plaintiffs to bring successful discrimination claims in the future. It will be 
a pivotal milestone to achieve federal employment discrimination 
protections for sexual orientation and gender identity. Yet it will be a 
hollow victory if those claims become actionable—but not winnable. As 
we have seen with same-sex sexual harassment claims post-Oncale, there 
must be clear and accessible evidentiary routes for plaintiffs to 
successfully plead claims. 
Fully addressing inequities in LGBTQ employment discrimination law 
will also require addressing two of the institutional problems surrounding 
this discussion: the reliance on the single-motive framework the statutory 
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language of employment discrimination laws. Courts need to shift away 
from their dependency on the single-motive framework to the more 
modern and inclusive “mixed-motive framework” established in Price 
Waterhouse.170  This will enable a plaintiff to plead more holistic theories 
in his or her Title VII claim and will better reflect the employer’s 
discriminatory response to his or her full intersectional identities—not 
simply a monolithic piece of his or her identities. 
Realistically, meaningful progress will begin before a lawsuit ever 
reaches a courtroom. Employers should also develop clear and expansive 
discrimination policies that work to effectively prevent and manage 
discrimination claims internally and foster more inclusive and tolerant 
workplace environments for all employees. Ideally, legislatures at the 
national, state, and municipal levels should also amend the statutory 
language of these laws to explicitly include sexual orientation and gender 
identity as protected characteristics.171 Doing so would help alleviate the 
statutory interpretation dilemmas courts continue to face today.172 Clear 
articulation of employment protections in the statutory codes will facilitate 
consistent application of employment protections by federal judges across 
the country. Ultimately, a holistic response to these problems will require 
the efforts of the courts, legislatures, agencies, and employers nationwide. 
 
 
 
170.   Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (establishing the availability of the 
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